This project was initiated by Jean (Jenny) Lanjouw. Tragically, Jenny died in late 2005, but had asked us to complete the project. This took much longer than expected because it involved complete reconstruction of the data set and empirical work. It is essentially a new paper in its current form, but it remains an important part of Jenny's legacy and a topic to which she devoted much of her intellectual and policy efforts. We hope she would be satisfied with our work which, for us, was a labor of love. We thank ABSTRACT This paper studies how patent rights and price regulation affect how fast new drugs are launched in different countries, using newly constructed data on launches of 642 new drugs in 76 countries for the period 1983-2002, and information on the duration and content of patent and price control regimes. Price regulation strongly delays launch, while longer and more extensive patent protection accelerates it. Health policy institutions, and economic and demographic factors that make markets more profitable, also speed up diffusion. The effects are robust to using instruments to control for endogeneity of policy regimes. The results point to an important role for patents and other policy choices in driving the diffusion of new innovations.
Introduction
In 1999 lovastatin, a blockbuster cholesterol drug with peak sales of more than $1 billion in the U.S., became commercially available in Egyptótwelve years after it was Örst approved for sale by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration. As we will show, this is not exceptionalólong launch lags are common and nearly 40 percent of all new drugs are only launched in ten or fewer countries. Since delayed launch means foregone health beneÖts, it is important to understand how public policy a §ects the di §usion of new drug innovations. In this paper we demonstrate that the patent and price regulation policies governments adopt have a powerful impact on the speed at which new drugs become available in di §erent countries.
Promoting a §ordable access to new drugs is a central objective of government policy.
There are two distinct challenges in achieving this: how to provide adequate incentives for the development of new drugs, and how to ensure a §ordable prices of drugs once they are developed. Governments use two main instruments to achieve these goals: patents and price regulation. It is well known that there is a tension between these objectives. The innovation literature emphasizes the basic tradeo § between the dynamic gains from stronger incentives to develop new technology provided by patents and the static welfare loss created by the resulting higher prices. 1 Much of the policy debate around patents and ìaccessî to new medicines has focused on pricingóthe potential for patent-protected products to leave large numbers of patients priced out the market in countries with limited private health insurance and poorly funded public health systems. As many poorer countries have been required to provide patent protection for pharmaceutical products under the 1994 TRIPS Agreement, patent policy has largely been evaluated in terms of the static welfare loss associated with higher prices in emerging markets (Chaudhuri, Goldberg and Gia, 2006; Duggan and Goyal, 2012 ; Kyle and Qian, 2013 ). 2 In the debates over the TRIPS Agreement (and more recently, the proposed TranspaciÖc Partnership trade agreement), developing countries and public health advocacy groups argued that harmonization of patent policy was both unnecessary and harmful when viewed 1 The classic statement of the tradeo § is Arrow (1962) , which spawned a huge literature. Empirical studies of the impact of patent rights on the rate and direction of innovation are more recent, and include Branstetter and Sakakibara (2001) , Moser (2005) , Qian (2007) , Kyle and McGahan (2012) , Williams (2013) , Galasso and Schankerman (2013) , and Budish, Roin and Williams (2014). 2 TRIPS is the acronym for the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, which is administered by the World Trade Organization. For discussion of the political economy of TRIPS and other international trade-related agreements, see Sell (2006) . Grossman and Lai (2004) provide a theoretical analysis of patent regimes in a trading world economy with di §erent market sizes and capacity for innovation; also see related work by There have also been studies of how price discrimination in pharmaceuticals can help improve global welfare while also preserving innovation incentives (e.g., Jack and Lanjouw, 2005) . 0 from the perspective of this tradeo §. 3 For low income countries, the welfare loss from patents involves not just the traditional static e¢ciency cost from prices above marginal cost, but also the worrying prospect that large segments of the population may have no a §ordable access to new drug therapies. This has led economists to recommend alternative ways for governments to provide innovation incentives while maintaining low prices in developing countries, especially for vaccines. 4 Moreover, the increase in innovation incentives from having patent rights in low income countries is likely to be small for many kinds of drugs because these countries do not account for a large part of the global market. 5 However, this debate misses a critical element: the impact patent rights and other policies have on the di §usion of new drugs. The public health beneÖts of new drugs depend, Örst, on how quickly drugs are launched in the ëlocalí markets in di §erent countries and, second, on how widely they are adopted within a country, once they have been launched. Once a drug has been discovered, the sunk R&D costs are not relevant to the decision to launch in di §erent countries. However, the decision to launch in a country, and to develop the marketing and distribution infrastructure required to promote within-country adoption, will be sensitive to drug manufacturersí assessment of anticipated proÖts relative to these country-speciÖc costs. Of course, if these costs were negligible, both aspects of di §usion would be driven by demand side factorsói.e., heterogeneity in the proÖtability of adoption in di §erent countries. This is the perspective that has been most emphasized in the economics literature on di §usion, beginning with the seminal work of Griliches (1957) . But di §usion also has a supply sideósunk investments required to enter new markets, set up distribution channels and inform potential customers about new products. If launch costs are su¢ciently large, the di §usion of new technologies will be signiÖcantly ináuenced by policies that a §ect proÖtability in di §erent markets. This supply-side perspective is at the heart of economic models of entry (e.g., Bresnahan and Reiss, 1988; Holmes, 2011; Collard-Wexler, 2013) , and has been under-appreciated as a factor limiting di §usion of innovations across di §erent markets.
Of course, the potential importance of patent rights in promoting global di §usion of innovation is not limited to pharmaceuticals. However, drugs are a good example to study both 1 because of their economic importance and because there are signiÖcant, country-speciÖc costs of launching new drugs. 6 These include the costs of conducting additional clinical trials to meet local requirements, obtaining regulatory approval, setting up local distribution and marketing networks, and educating healthcare providers. These Öxed costs must be incurred in every country in which a drug is launched: outside tightly integrated trading blocs such as the European Union, there are few international protocols that recognize regulatory approval of drugs across borders, and limited economies of geographic scope in marketing and distribution. Moreover, the bulk of these entry costs apply whether or not the Örst entrant in a country is the original innovator of the drug, its licensee or a generic imitator.
Existing studies on the relationship between intellectual property rights and the spread of new technologies have focused on two main channels, international trade and technology transfer by multinational companies. In particular, two recent papers identify these impacts by exploiting the strengthening of IP rights, mostly associated with the TRIPS Agreement.
Delgado, Kyle and McGahan (2013) show that the timing of implementation of TRIPS (the compliance date varied across countries) is associated with increased trade áows in sectors that are IP-intensive relative to a control group. They Önd that the impact varies substantially across sectors, and notably was larger in the information and communication technology sector than in biopharmaceuticals, where compliance was subject to more exceptions and complementary resources in distribution play a large role. Branstetter, Fishman and Foley (2006) use Örm-level data to show that royalty payments and R&D expenditures by multinational a¢liates increase after IP reforms were adopted in sixteen countries (some before TRIPS) and that this e §ect is concentrated among a¢liates of parent companies that use U.S. patents extensively prior to the reforms. In both of these papers, the patent reforms are treated as exogenous events.
There are two main related studies of cross-country di §usion of pharmaceuticals. Kyle (2007) uses a large data set on new molecules launched in OECD countries from 1980-2000, and shows that price regulation signiÖcantly retards launches and, interestingly, that Örms are less likely to follow launch in a low-price country with launch in a high-price country (possibly due to ëreference pricingí policies by drug price regulators). However, the paper does not examine the impact of patent rights on drug launch dates, as there is not much variation among OECD countries. In related research, Kyle (2006) analyzes a similar sample of drug launches in the smaller set of G7 countries, focusing on how Örm 6 A launch decision in one country may depend on policy regimes in other countries. Such ëpolicy externalitiesí can arise from benchmark pricing formulas (Bloom and van Reneen, 1998; Jacobzone, 2000; Brekke, Grasdal and Holmas, 2009; Kyle, 2007) , and parallel trade that erodes price di §erences across country borders (Kanavos et. al., 2004; Ganslandt and Maskus, 2004) . In this paper we focus on how domestic policies a §ect launch lags, but do not incorporate these policy externalities. A full treatment of dynamic entry decisions across markets with spillover e §ects remains an important topic for future research. characteristics a §ect launch timing (possibly because they are correlated with unobserved entry costs). 7 In this paper we study how both patent regimes and price regulation, as well as economic factors such as market size and demographics, a §ect the speed and geographic extent of di §usion of new pharmaceutical products across countries. The empirical analysis is based on a large data set that covers launches of 642 new drugs in up to 76 countries during the period 1983-2002, together with information on the nature and evolution of patent and price regulation regimes in these countries. Importantly, the countries in the data set span all levels of economic development, exhibit a wide variety of patent regimes, and changed important aspects of patent policy with respect to pharmaceuticals over time.
In the analysis we distinguish between two types of patent rights: those that protect of methods of manufacture (ëprocess patentsí) and those that protect pharmaceutical products (ëproduct patentsí). Process patents are considered relatively weak, as they do not prevent cost-based competitive entry by entrants with superior manufacturing processes. Indeed, some countries (such as India) purposefully adopted a ìprocess-onlyî patent regime for pharmaceutical innovations in order to foster a domestic industry based on inventing around originatorsí manufacturing processes. Product patents are typically considered stronger rights, blocking entry by competitive (or generic) products and allowing for more e §ective appropriation of rents. However, there is a wide variation across countries (and over time within countries) in both the duration and content of both process and product patents, which provides the potential for identifying the e §ects of regime choice on di §usion.
There are four main empirical Öndings in the paper. First, we show that new drugs become available in many countries only after long lags (often more than 10 years) between the date when a product in Örst launched commercially anywhere in the world (typically in the US, Europe, or Japan) and its launch in other countries. Many new drugs are never launched outside a handful of wealthier countries. Second, we demonstrate that the patent policies governments adopt strongly a §ect how quickly new drug therapies are launched in their countries. Longer duration, and stronger, patent rights substantially speed up di §usion. These impacts are large and robust to a variety of empirical speciÖcations. For example, controlling for economic and demographic factors, moving from a regime of no product patents to a long product patent term increases the per-period hazard of launch by about 23 percent. Allowing for endogeneity of policy regimes using instrumental variables increases the magnitude of estimated e §ect to between 64 percent and 72 percent, depending on the choice of instruments. This is equivalent to reducing launch lags by about 100 percent. Short product patents have no e §ect. Process patents also promote faster launch, but the impact is not as large as for product patents. Importantly, we Önd that these e §ects hold equally for low and middle income countries as for high income countries.
Third, we show that countries that adopt strong pharmaceutical price regulation experience signiÖcantly longer launch lags for new drugs. We estimate that introducing price regulation decreases the per-period hazard of launch by about 15 percent, which is equivalent to increasing launch lags by about 25 percent (when instrumented, 49 to 60 percent reduction in the hazard rate, equivalent to about a 80 percent to 100 percent increase in launch lags.) Fourth, we Önd that new drugs are launched much faster in countries that have health policy institutions that promote availability and distribution of drugsóin particular, adopting the Essential Drug List of the World Health Organization and having a National Formularyóand these institutions do not appear to be simply a proxy for unobserved institutional quality.
Finally, we Önd that local market size, as captured by population, per capita income, health expenditures, and demographic factors ináuencing drug use) has a big impact on the speed of drug launches. These results are consistent with earlier studies of U.S. data
showing that market size is related to both higher levels of pharmaceutical innovation and non-generic entry (e.g., Scott-Morton, 1999; Acemoglu and Linn, 2004; Dubois, Mouzon, Scott Morton and Seabright, 2011).
All of these key Öndings are robust to using a variety of instrumental variables, based primarily on a countryís political and legal institutions, to address potential concern about endogeneity of policy regimes. In fact, the estimated impacts of price regulation and patent policy using instruments (in a full information maximum likelihood framework) are, as indicated above, higher than those in the baseline speciÖcations of the hazard model. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a simple dynamic model of drug launches, as a framework for interpreting our empirical results. In Section 3 we describe the data set (details are provided in the Data Appendix). Section 4 presents non-parametric evidence on the geographic and temporal di §usion of new drugs, and how it varies with the economic development and patent and price regulation regimes. We describe the speciÖcation of the hazard model of drug launches in Section 5.1 and the main econometric results in Section 5.2. In Section 6 we present robustness analysis. In Section 7 we show that the results are robust to using instruments to address the endogeneity of policy regimes. Section 8 uses our parameter estimates to simulate the impact of counterfactual policy regimes on drug di §usion. In the conclusion we summarize the key Öndings and directions for future research.
A Model of Drug Launch
Consider a Örm that has developed a new drug i which can be launched in a set of countries, denoted by j = 1; :::; J: The Örm obtains a product patent on the drug in each country at time t = 0: 8 Patent protection lasts for T j periods in country j. After the patent expires, we assume that generic competition drives the price to marginal cost.
If the Örm launches the drug in country j, it incurs a sunk entry cost of  ij : 9 During patent protection, the Örm earns áow proÖt in period t equal to (x ij )! ijt , where x ij denotes a vector of variables that capture market size, regulation and health institutions, and demographic characteristics of the country. In our analysis, we use three variables to capture market size, population, GDP per capita, and health expenditures per GDP. Regulatory variables include measures of the duration and strength of patent policies (both for pharmaceutical products and processes, as explained later) and price controls. Demographic variables include the fraction of the population over 65 and a measure of income inequality.
The variable ! ijt denotes a proÖtability shock that reáects unobservable factors a §ecting demand and productivity. For simplicity, in the model (though not in the empirical work),
we treat x ij as constant over time.
We assume ! ijt evolves as a Örst-order Markov process
where  2 (0; 1);  i and  j denote drug and country-speciÖc random e §ects, respectively, which we assume the Örm knows, and  ijt is an iid disturbance. The random e §ects allow the proÖtability shock ! ijt to be correlated across countries for a given drug, and across drugs for a given country. 10 The Markov speciÖcation implies that Pr(! ijt j ! ij;t1 ) is stochastically increasing in ! ij;t1 :
The present value of launch at time t, conditional on available information, is
The Örst country in which a patent is applied for sets the global priority date. International patent protocols require that the inventor apply for protection in other countries within 18 months of the priority date, after which the right expires. As an empirical matter, the launch of new drugs often occurs much later than the patent application date. Our assumption that the drug is patented in all countries is made for simplicity only. 9 The entry cost includes the cost of obtaining regulatory approval in the target country (there is no mechanism for multi-country regulatory review), investment in physical distribution channels, information provision to doctors and pharmacies, and securing registration on the national drug formulary. These costs can vary substantially both with the type of drug and the country of launch. 10 The random e §ects speciÖcation implies that E(!ijt! i 0 jt ) =  2  and E(!ijt! ij 0 t ) =  2  for i 6 = i 0 and j 6 = j 0 :
where  2 (0; 1) is the discount rate. The Örm launches the drug in country j when E(V ijt j ! ijt ;  i ;  j )  0: Given the Markov assumption on !; the optimal entry rule is to launch the drug when the proÖt shock ! ijt exceeds a threshold level, !  ijt (Ericson and Pakes, 1995) . Essentially, this rule applies because the value function
The Örst-order Markov assumption delivers a simple closed-form solution for !  ijt : From equation (1),
where  =  2 (0; 1) and (T j t) = 1+
The entry threshold !  ijt is determined by Z ijt = (x ij ; T j ; t;  i ;  j ) which we assume the Örm observes. The threshold is declining in patent duration T j and variables that increase áow proÖt (x ij ); including the duration and strength of patent rights, and rising in the sunk entry cost  ij ; elapsed time since Örst worldwide launch t; and price regulation which reduces áow proÖt. The threshold increases with time since Örst worldwide launch t because, when the remaining patent period T j  t is smaller, the proÖt shock must be larger to generate su¢cient expected áow proÖts to cover the entry cost.
The probability that the drug is launched in country j at time t; given that it has not been launched before (the hazard rate), is
where the second equality follows from the Örst-order Markov assumption on !: This implies that the hazard rate is a decreasing function of factors that raise the threshold !  ijt :This is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition: The hazard rate of drug launch in a country is increasing in factors that increase áow proÖt, including the duration and strength of patent protection, population, GDP per capita, health expenditures per GDP and the fraction of population over 65. The hazard rate of drug launch is declining in price regulation which reduces áow proÖt, and in the time elapsed since Örst launch and the sunk cost of entry.
In the empirical analysis we estimate a hazard model of drug launch to examine some of these predictions..
Data and Measurement
In this section we brieáy describe the construction of the data set. Details of the procedures and sources are provided in the Data Appendix.
Identifying drug launches
A launch is deÖned as the Örst appearance of the identiÖed molecule (new chemical entity) in a given country, whether in proprietary or generic form. Determining if, and when, a new drug becomes available in a given country is not straightforward. Since almost all countries require formal approval from a health and safety regulator before a drug can be marketed, administrative records could potentially be used for this purpose. But poor record keeping in some countries, lack of easily accessible public records, and language barriers make it infeasible to track regulatory approvals for large numbers of drugs across many countries, particularly for historical data. Regulatory approvals also do not directly track commercial availability (formal approval is not the same as de facto launch of a product).
We rely on a compilation of product launches obtained from a commercial market research company, IMS Health Inc. This database tracks product launches in all therapeutic classes in up to 76 di §erent countries from 1983-2002. Product launches were identiÖed by IMS from a variety of sources, including regulatory approvals, announcements by manufacturers, local media reports, and IMSí active surveillance of distribution channels as part of other data gathering e §orts. Because India was not covered by IMS during this period, we supplement this data source with information from an Indian market research company, ORG/MARG, that tracked product launches in a limited set of therapeutic over the same period.
To track launches accurately, drugs must be unambiguously identiÖed across countries.
Unfortunately there is considerable variation across time and over countries in how a given 7 chemical entity is named. 11 Failing to recognize equivalent chemical entities will result in over-counting of new products, under-counting of the number of countries in which a given drug is launched, and inaccurate dating of launches. As detailed in the Data Appendix, it took considerable e §ort to track the history of drug launches in these data due to changes in country coverage, and di¢culties in consistently identifying drugs due to variations in product names. The source dataset contains more than 180,000 observations on product-country launches. These products contained approximately 9,600 distinct active drug ingredients in use around the world during the sample period, for which we compiled more than 250,000 synonyms from a variety of reference sources. Of these 9,600 distinct active ingredients we focus on 642 clearly identiÖable chemical entities that were Örst introduced anywhere in the world during this period, and then identify the date when they Örst appear in any product launched in each country. Several important choices were made in creating this dataset to minimize under-counting of launches. We excluded products in a variety of therapeutic classes where it was particularly di¢cult to identify active ingredients unambiguously. 12 We also used a relatively broad deÖnition of what constitutes an equivalent chemical entity by grouping together all of the salts and esters of a given ëactive moietyí. This procedure may ignore clinically important di §erences among variants that would lead a pharmacologist to distinguish between di §erent products, but it makes our results conservative in the sense that we may be over-counting launches of equivalent products. Because the country coverage of the source data expanded over time (and ënewí countries appeared, such as the Czech Republic and Slovakia) we were careful to account for left-censoring of launches (i.e. drugs were excluded from being ëat riskí of launch in a country if their Örst worldwide launch occurred prior to entry of the country into the dataset.)
Patent and price control regimes
For each country in our sample, we characterize the domestic patent regime along four dimensions: duration of patent term, coverage of pharmaceutical products, coverage of chemical manufacturing processes, and an index of the strength of patent protection that reáects the degree to which patent law provisions favor patent holders versus potential infringers (Pro-patent Index, which varies from zero to one). The variables are constructed using data from Ginarte and Park (1997) , Park (2008) and other reference sources cited in the Data Appendix. These variables change slowly over time, and while there is considerable convergence towards the ìTRIPS standardî (e.g., 20 year term, no exceptions for pharmaceutical products) by the end of the sample period, there was considerable variation among countries during the 1980ís and 1990ís.
We have no reason to believe that the relationship between patent term and the hazard of drug launch is linear. Rather than impose a functional form, we use three mutually exclusive dummy variables to capture patent term duration: Short = 0 < duration  12 years (from application date); Medium = 13  duration  17 and Long = duration  18 (the reference category is no patent protection). 13 Note that since the average period between patent application and marketing approval on a product is about 10 years (Grabowski and Kyle, 2007), a Short patent conveys essentially no e §ective coverage to the patentee. We use two separate sets of these dummy variables, one for product patents (Short_Product, Medium_Product and Long_Product) and another for process patents (Short_Process, Medium_Process and Long_Process). In terms of country/year observations, short, medium and long process patents account for 10.8, 22.3 and 60.0 percent of the sample; for product patents the Ögures are 6.4, 16.5 and 58.2 percent, respectively. We experimented with di §erent deÖnitions of the cuto §s for these patent duration categories: Short 0-10, 0-11 and 0-13; Medium 11-16, 12-16, 13-16, 13-17 and 14-16; and Long  17,  18 and  19. As we discuss later, the econometric results presented in Section 5 are generally robust to these alternatives.
Countries approach the control of pharmaceutical prices in a bewildering variety of ways. We consider systems of explicit price regulation and summarize the variation across countries with two dummy variablesóone for the existence of ìsomeî price regulation and the second for ìextensiveî price control. A price regime is labeled as ìextensiveî if all drugs are regulated, rather than just a subset of the market, or if a countryís price regulation is identiÖed by commentators as being particularly rigorous. The set of reports and legal texts consulted in making this determination are given in Lanjouw (2005) . In the sample, 22 percent of country/year observations are coded as having no price controls, 31 percent with some price regulation and 47 percent with extensive controls. 14 
Pharmaceutical policy institutions
The observed timing of market entry reáects both the decisions of Örms and the ef-Öciency of a countryís regulatory process. We capture government policies that promote access to pharmaceuticals by coding three dummy variables for each country-year. The Örst is whether a country had adopted a national formulary, where listed drugs would be eligible for distribution through a publicly funded health system, typically more widely prescribed, 13 Where the patent term runs from date of grant rather than date of application, as was the case in e.g. the U.S. prior to 1995, we added two years to make the term roughly equivalent to one running from date of application. Results were not sensitive to changing this assumption about the pendency period to three years.
14 Appendix Table 1 provides information, for each country in the sample, on the number of years of coverage, number of drugs launched, average percentage of drugs launched within 5 years of their initial launch date anywhere, and the product patent, process patent, and price regulation regimes and their changes over time. 9 and with payment mechanisms in place. The second is whether a country had adopted the Essential Drug List (EDL) promulgated by the World Health Organization, which indicates that a countryís health institutions are oriented towards promoting access to basic drugs.
The third is whether a country has a formal ìnational drug policy,î i.e. an e §ort to coordinate industrial policy and domestic regulation to promote access to safe and e §ective pharmaceuticals. At the start of our sample period, 65 percent of countries had a national formulary, 41 percent had adopted the EDL and 63 percent had issued a national drug policy; by 1997 all countries had adopted all three.
Demographic and Income Variables
We use a set of income and demographic variables to control for variations in the potential demand for pharmaceuticals. These include: population size and the fraction of population over 65 years old, real GDP per capita in purchasing power parity terms, income inequality measured by the Gini coe¢cient, and health care expenditures as a percent of GDP. We also include measures of the quality of regulatory bureaucracy and the rule of law, both taken from the World Bank.
Many of the explanatory variables are available annually, but others only in one or several cross-sections (details in the Data Appendix). Table 1 presents summary statistics for the variables used in the econometric analysis.
Drug Di §usion: Non-parametric Evidence
We begin with some non-parametric evidence on the pattern of global drug di §usion. Table   2 presents information on the geographic span of drug launches, and shows the distribution of the number of countries for which a launch was observed for each drug in the sample.
Recognizing that this tabulation does not account for right-censoring (some drugs may have launched in some countries after the sample period ends), these statistics illustrate the dominant, and striking, feature of this measure of di §usion: how limited it is. In the entire sample of new drugs, 39 percent were launched in ten or fewer countries, and only 41 percent were launched in more than 25 countries. The mean number of countries in which a drug was launched is 22.4 (median of 18) out of a possible 76. The fact that drugs are not launched more widely can be due to various factors: the limited size and demographic features of markets, and the availability of substitutes, may limit anticipated demand to a level that does not justify the cost of entry; di §erences in disease patterns across countries;
and rejection by some local regulatory authorities. Even among the wealthier countries with most developed health care systems, not all of these drugs became available during the sample period: the USA, Germany, and the UK, for example, saw launches of only about 60 percent of the sample of drugs. The limited availability of new drugs (at least by this 10 measure) suggests a substantial welfare loss. The good news from a welfare perspective is that the geographic di §usion is substantially wider for the (arguably) higher quality drugsó as proxied by those obtaining approval from the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, which is among the most stringent regulatory agencies in the world (column 3), and the subset of FDA-approved drugs that pass a priority review screening (column 4). 15 For these drugs, more than half are eventually launched in more than 25 countries (though with long lags, as we will see later). But even among these high quality new drugs, 13 percent were only launched in three or less countries within the sample period.
Because launch lags (the time elapsed between Örst worldwide launch and launch in a given country) can be long and the sample is truncated at 2002, Table 2 likely underrepresents the true extent of di §usion. To examine the temporal aspects of di §usion, and to address this potential undercounting of launches, in Table 3 and Figures 1 through the higher quality drugs (second and third columns of Table 3 ). The full distribution of estimated launch lags broken out by countriesí income level is given in Figure 2 . (Medium income includes both the lower middle and upper middle income categories of the World Bank.) Third, the pace and extent of di §usion is strongly associated with a countryís patent and price regulation regimes. In the second panel of Table 3 and in Figure 3 we show results broken out by a summary measure of each countryís patent regime. The duration of patent rights is categorized as None, Short, Medium and Long (recall that we deÖne Short as a patent term of 10 years or less, Medium as 11 to 16 years and Long as 17 years or longer) and a country/year observation is assigned to that category if it had either process and/or product patents in that group. With no patents, the estimated time for 25 percent of drugcountry launch opportunities to be Ölled is eight years, falling to less than 2.6 years with long-duration patents. In the third panel of Table 3 and in Figure 4 we group observations where there was either no or weak price regulation versus strong. 16 In countries with no or weak price regulation, the equivalent statistic is three years, rising to Öve where price regulation is strong. The estimated ëfailureí functions plotted in Figures 3 and 4 are very di §erent across categories, and the log-rank test for homogeneity strongly rejects the null of no di §erence across categories:  2 (3) = 750 for patent regimes, and  2 (2) = 267 for price controls.
Empirical Model and Results

Econometric SpeciÖcation
To analyze the timing of drug launches more formally, and control for other covariates, we use a parametric hazard model. A launch is deÖned as the Örst appearance of the identiÖed molecule (new chemical entity) in a given country, whether in proprietary or generic form. The launch lag in a country is dated relative to the Örst global launch of the molecule (measured in days). We adopt the proportional hazard model with the Weibull distribution. The hazard of launch for drug i in country j at time t can be expressed as
where x ij (t) is a set of time-varying covariates and the scalar  > 0 and vector  are parameters to be estimated. This speciÖcation imposes a monotone hazard rate, but it can be either increasing ( > 1) or decreasing ( < 1) over time. The model of drug launch in Section 2 predicts that the hazard rate declines with t : since the remaining patent duration falls with t; the threshold proÖtability shock required for launch must be larger to generate rents to cover the entry cost. The parameter estimates of  presented below conÖrm this prediction. 17 For continuous covariates, the parameter  l reported in the tables correspond to the percentage change in the per period conditional probability (hazard) of launch due to a unit change in x l (for discrete covariates, e.g., patent and price regulation regimes,  l is the percentage change in moving from the reference category to the focal regime). 18 Equivalently, we can interpret the negative of the parameters (scaled by the estimate of )
as the log change in the predicted time to launch.
For any given drug the hazard of launch is likely to di §er across countries for reasons other than a countryís economic and demographic characteristics and policy regime, for example if the incidence of the relevant disease varies across countries. We address this in three ways. First, we include a set of 14 therapeutic class dummies (the ëÖrst levelí ATC code assigned by the World Health Organization) in all regressions. This allows the baseline hazard rate to be di §erent for each group of drugs. Second, in all regressions we use standard errors clustered at the drug-country level. Finally, as one of the robustness checks, we allow for unobserved heterogeneity across drugs by including a random drug e §ect. Turning to the key policy variables, the Örst important Önding is that extensive price controls signiÖcantly delay drug di §usion. 19 Having strong price regulation reduces the hazard of launch by 15 percent, equivalent to 25 percent increase in the predicted launch lag. 20 In addition, both process and product patents have a large e §ect on launch lags. In interpreting these coe¢cients, it is important to recognize that these dummies are mutually exclusive within process and within product, but not across product and process. Thus while the estimated coe¢cient on Short_Process implies that relative to having no patent protection, a short process patent regimeósuch as that used by India between 1971 and 2005óreduces launch lags by 19 percent, moving to Medium_Process gives an incremental gain of 13 percent. The coe¢cient on Long_Process is smaller (and not signiÖcant),
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suggesting that long process patents may undermine vibrant process-related innovation as an avenue for entry by indigenous Örms (but caution is warranted, as we later show that
Long_Process is signiÖcant when we use instrumental variables to account for endogeneity of policy regimes). It should also be noted that the coe¢cient on Short_Process is identiÖed o § a relatively small number of observations: only a handful of countries in the sample had this type of patent regime, and some for only limited periods of time, and it is possible that the estimated e §ect is confounded with other (unobserved) aspects of their internal market. One of these countries was India, which may be a special case in terms of the size of its internal market and success in developing a highly competitive export-oriented generic sector during this period.
The parameters also show that long product patents have a powerful e §ect on di §usion. Short product patents, Short_Product ( 10 years), and medium product patents,
Medium_Product, do not have strongly signiÖcant e §ects relative to no patent protection, which is what would be expected given the long development and regulatory lags (and the fact that patents are taken out very early in the R&D process to ensure priority). However, long product patents (Long_Product) reduce launch lags by 55 percent. 21 In addition to patent term, the content of patent protection also matters for di §usion. The point estimate of the Pro-patent Index is statistically signiÖcant and implies that a one standard deviation increase in the index reduces predicted launch lags by about 11.3 percent. 22 It is also worth pointing out that patent rights can a §ect the direction, as well as the speed, of drug di §usion. Strong patent rights may be particularly important for inducing launch of drugs that are only useful for treating smaller patient populations. Non-patent advantages over competitors (e.g., market frictions, Örst mover advantages etc.) may be su¢cient for Örst entrants to recover Öxed costs of entry for blockbuster drugs, but this will typically not be the case for other types of drugs.
In column (2) Medium_Product, where Short_Product becomes much smaller and statistically insigniÖcant and Medium_Product increases to about one half the magnitude of Long_Product and 21 Taken at face value, this regression speciÖcation would also imply that the product and process e §ects are additive: e.g., a country with Medium_Process and Long_Product would have 32.4 + 54.5 =95% lower launch lags. In fact, since the patent terms likely overlap substantial, the actual period of market exclusivity for the patent holder will be close to the longer of the patent terms, and the impact on launch lags is better estimated by the largest of the two coe¢cients rather than their sum. 22 As indicated in Section 3, we tried using di §erent deÖnitions of the patent term for both process and product patents. The parameter estimates are similar to those reported in Table 4 . The only notable di §erences occur when we deÖne long patents as  17 years (rather than the baseline deÖnition  18). In that case, the point estimates of the coe¢cients on Medium_Process and Long_Product decline by about a third (though the di §erences are not statistically signiÖcant), and the coe¢cient on Long_Process is now positive and statistically signiÖcant. is that the estimated coe¢cients on the price regulation and patent regime variables are robust to adding these new controls. Second, drugs are launched faster in countries with more elderly in the population, and the implied impact is largeóa standard deviation increase in the fraction of population over age 65 reduces launch lags by 21 percent. Third, we Önd that, for a given level of GDP per capita, the distribution of income is a signiÖcant determinant of market entry. Greater income inequality (higher Gini) increases the speed of di §usion signiÖcantlyóthe coe¢cient implies that a standard deviation rise in the Gini index reduces launch lags by 23 percent. The likely reason is that greater inequality makes it more likely that there are at least some elements in the population (the ëwealthy eliteí) that can a §ord to buy the drugs. 23 Next we use dummy controls for three health policy institutionsówhether the country has a national formulary, an essential drug list, and a national drug policy. The essential drug list and national formulary play two roles. They facilitate the distribution of drugs to the population, which should increase e §ective market size and thus promote earlier drug launches. At the same time, they signal more e §ective institutions for implementing any price control regimes that may be in place, which would reduce incentives to launch. Their impact is thus an empirical question. We Önd that these health institutions have a large and statistically signiÖcant impact on the speed of drug di §usion. The point estimates imply that the predicted time to launch is 31 percent lower in countries that have adopted the Essential Drug List, 24 and an additional 16 percent lower if they have a national formulary in place. We Önd no signiÖcant e §ect of having a formal national drug policy which may not be surprising since, while it signals policy intent, it is a less concrete manifestation than the other two institutions. 25 Unfortunately, it is not possible with the available data to unbundle 23 While this may be true in countries with relatively low levels of per capita income, one might think that inequality could have a smaller, or perhaps even an opposite, e §ect in higher income countries (where less inequality might empower more consumers to be able to a §ord new drugs). When we drop high income countries from the sample and re-estimate the model (reported later), we still Önd that inequality reduces launch lags, but the coe¢cient is only half as large. This is consistent with the idea that there is a threshold level of income that makes an individual a potential consumer of new drugs, and the e §ect of inequality on the demand for drugs depends on the distribution of income around that threshold. 24 This is not the e §ect on launch times for drugs which are listed on the EDL. While it would be interesting to look at the di §usion rate speciÖcally for EDL-listed drugs, there were too few additions to the EDL during the sample period to do this reliably. these institutions and identify the speciÖc features that make entry more attractive. This is an important challenge but it requires more detail about the how these institutions actually function in di §erent countries.
Finally, it may be important to recognize that the quality of regulatory agencies varies across countries. If this is correlated with the choice of policy regimes, we might misattribute the impact of such policies on the timing of drug launches. To address this concern, in column (4) we include a measure of bureaucratic quality for each country/year observation, taken from the World Bank. We expect countries with higher quality regulators to screen more carefully, and this should generate longer launch lags on average. However, the impact of better screening should depend on the quality of the drugómore e §ective regulators are more likely to block, or delay, low quality drugs. To test this idea, we interact the measure of bureaucratic quality with dummy variables for whether the drug was approved by the FDA (BQ_FDA and BQ_nonFDA). When we do this, the estimated coe¢cients on the demographic and policy variables remain stable. The new Önding is that higher quality bureaucracy is associated with longer launch lags for all drugs but, as expected, the e §ect is an order of magnitude larger for low quality drugs than for those approved by the FDA, and both are statistically signiÖcant. The parameter estimates imply that a standard deviation increase in bureaucratic quality increases launch lags by three percent for FDA-approved drugs, but by almost 50 percent for low quality drugs.
Robustness Analysis
In this section we check the robustness of the main results to a variety of di §erent speciÖcations. In each case, we introduce the changes relative to the baseline speciÖcation given in column (4) of Table 4 .
First, in column (1) of Table 5 we introduce random drug e §ects, to allow for unobserved drug-speciÖc variation such as a drugís potential market size (i.e., di §erence in the incidence of the targeted diseases or conditions) or di §erences in the di¢culty and cost of obtaining regulatory approval. These random e §ects enter as a multiplicative factor in the model for the hazard function, and are assumed to follow a Gamma distribution (this standard formulation yields a convenient analytical expression for the likelihood function). Overall, the results are similar to (and not statistically di §erent from) the estimates of the baseline speciÖcation.
Second, we re-estimated the baseline regression using a more disaggregated classiÖcation of therapeutic categories. This uses 61 rather than 14 therapeutic classes, based on the second level of the World Health Organization ATC classiÖcation (for example, ëantihypertensivesí as opposed to ëcardiovascular systemí). The results, given in column (2), are very close to the baseline speciÖcation.
Third, we examine whether our previous results for the pooled sample of drugs also hold when the model is estimated using data only for (arguably) higher quality drugs, as represented by those that were approved by the FDA in the U.S. Since high quality drugs are especially important for public health, it is critical to know how policy choices a §ect their di §usion. In addition, idiosyncratic regulatory requirements on safety and e¢cacy may make it possible for drugs to be approved in one country but then fail to reach other markets because they do not meet the local regulatory standards. As a consequence, an observed failure to launch may be driven by variation in the regulatory environment, rather than by the proÖtability calculations as modeled in Section 2. Focusing on drugs approved by the FDA, one of the worldís most stringent regulatory authorities, helps rule this outóalbeit without addressing problems such as a drug failing to launch because a country requires that clinical trials be conducted on its own residents before approving a drug and these are too costly relative to anticipated proÖts. The results are presented in column (3). All of our main Öndings hold up, and the point estimates are very close to the estimates from the baseline speciÖcation for both price regulation and patent policy regimes, as well as the other covariates.
Fourth, we consider di §erences between high income and developing countries. Historically there has been much less variation in patent regimes in high-income countries than in developing economies and there was (and remains) serious opposition to harmonization of patent policies under the TRIPS Agreement. Opponents of harmonization on a relatively long-duration and broad-based patent standard asserted then (and now) that the e §ects of patent protection are likely to be more damaging for developing countries, both because their capacity to innovate in drugs was lower (reducing any positive incentive e §ects from patents) and because the deleterious price e §ects of patent protection could fatally undermine the market for drugs in poorer countries. However, the important question of impact of patent rights on the di §usion of drugs (as opposed to their pricing) has received little attention in these debates. We examine this question in column (4) of Table 5 , where we drop high income countries from the sample. It is striking that the qualitative results, and most of the point estimatesóincluding the coe¢cients on the policy regimesóare very similar to the baseline speciÖcation where we use all countries. The main di §erences are that the impact of population is smaller among lower/middle income countries, the propatent index is no longer signiÖcant, and the relative magnitudes of the impact of EDL and national formularies are reversed.
Fifth, we extend the baseline speciÖcation to allow for interactions between price regulation and patent policy regimes. There are reasons to expect the e §ect of patent regimes to depend on whether there is strong price regulation in place. In the extreme case where price controls bring prices down to unit cost, patent protection would not provide any incentive for launch. In less extreme cases, we would expect the incentives from patent rights to be reduced. To investigate this, we interact the dummy for price regulation with the two extreme patent regimes, Short_Process and Long_Product. 26 The results in column (5) provide some evidence that price controls strongly dilute the incentive e §ects of patent protection. In the absence of price regulation, the point estimates of Short_Process and Long_Product on the launch hazard are both about 0.33 and highly signiÖcant. When there is strong price regulation, the impact of Short_Process falls essentially to zero (the estimate is -0.04, and the test on the sum of coe¢cients does not reject the null of zero, p-value=0.63), while for Long_Product it declines by about 40 percent to 0.204 but is still strongly signiÖcant (p-value <0.001). These results highlight the importance of taking the interactions between policy instruments into account in designing overall policy strategy for pharmaceuticals.
Finally, we investigate how indigenous innovative capacity a §ects the timing of drug launches. A drug can be launched by the Örm that developed it, its licensee, or a domestic competitor (often, a generic drug company) in cases where the new molecule is not protected by a product patent. To cover launch costs, the most common avenue for competitive entry by indigenous Örms is to innovate on the drug manufacturing processótypically involving chemical engineeringóand protect it with a process patent. Our data do not unambiguously identify whether products are launched in a country by the product innovator, its licensee, or a competitor, so we cannot directly examine the role of competitive entry. Instead, we construct a proxy to capture local technical capacity to do process innovation, using the stock of patents in Öelds related to chemical engineering and manufacturing in each country/year, and test how this innovative capacity a §ect the timing of launches. 27 When we add this control (column 6), the estimated parameters on the patent and price regulation (and other) variables are robust. This shows that the observed policy regimes are not simply proxies for having a strong local R&D capability (which might in turn ináuence which policies are adopted). The point estimate on the stock of chemical patents is positive and statistically signiÖcant, indicating that countries with greater local capacity for chemical process innovation (and, presumably, therefore, local pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity) have somewhat faster drug launches. This points to a potentially important role for indigenous entry, and highlights the need for process patent protection in countries with local technical capacity (especially where product patent rights are absent or ine §ective).
Endogenous Policy Regimes
Patent and price control regimes are outcomes of a political process, which raises a concern about endogeneity. The most likely source is unobserved heterogeneity across countries in political institutions that a §ects both the choice of policy regime and the timing of new drug launchesóe.g., variation across countries in the proÖtability of markets, institutional quality and policy enforcement. 28 For example, Örms have greater incentives to lobby for strong patent rights where entry is more proÖtable, which would cause us to over-estimate the e §ect of patent rights on the timing of drug launches. But the bias can also go the other wayócountries with weak enforcement may be more willing to adopt the appearance of strong patent rights, inducing negative covariance of patent rights with the disturbance and thus a downward bias. However, patent reform is often forced as a condition of entry into new political groups (e.g., joining the European Union), bilateral trade negotiations, and international trade agreements such as TRIPS (Sell, 2003 ), all of which may limit the scope for endogenous patent regimes. Price regulation is more likely to su §er from endogeneity, To address concerns over endogeneity, we need instrumental variables that are correlated with policy choices but do not directly a §ect the timing of drug launches (and uncorrelated with unobserved country level heterogeneity). We use a set of Öve instruments based on political, legal and demographic characteristics of a country (details of the variables and sources are provided in the Data Appendix). The Örst is Political_Constraints which measures the degree to which voting rights within the political (legislative and executive) structure constrains policy change (this is used in the political science literature as a proxy for credible policy commitment). The second is Executive_Orientation which codes whether the executive comes from a right, left or center party with respect to its orientation on economic policy (the reference category is no executive). The third instrument is Ethnolinguistic_diversity which is a measure of population diversity that has been used in the economics and political science literature as an indicator of di¢culty in reaching and committing to political decisions. These three instruments vary across countries and over time. The fourth instrument, Legal_Origin, codes whether the legal system is based on common law (U.K.), French law, or German law, with Socialist or other legal origins as the reference category; this measure is time invariant. The last instrument is RTA which is the cumulative number of regional trade agreements that the country has entered into, which varies across countries and over time.
There is no compelling reason to think that the Örst three instruments either directly affect launch decisions or are correlated with unobserved institutional quality or proÖtability of local markets, conditional on the policy regimes and other controls. However, one might be concerned that the number of RTAís reáects unobserved trade openness of an economy, which could a §ect launch decisions. For this reason, and more generally to examine the robustness of the parameter estimates to the choice of instruments, we use four alternative subsets of instruments. The narrowest set includes only Political_Constraints and Executive_Orientation. The second set adds Ethnolinguistic_diversity, the third includes Legal_Origin and the most expansive set also adds RTA.
We begin by testing the exogeneity of price controls and patent policy regimes using the Rivers-Vuong (1988) approach. To do this, we estimate ëÖrst stageí regressions for the choice of policy regimesóspeciÖcally, a Probit for price regulation and Ordered Probits for the process and product patent regimes. In these regressions, we use all controls from the baseline speciÖcation of the hazard model plus the various sets of instruments described above. While the instruments are not derived from a structural model of policy regime choice, the instruments have statistically signiÖcant explanatory power in these regressions. 29 Likelihood ratio tests decisively reject the null hypothesis that the instruments have no e §ect on the choice of price regulation and patent regimes (p-values <0.001 for all four sets of instruments). 30 Using the Örst stage regressions, we compute the generalized 29 Given the importance of political economy considerations on the choice of intellectual property regimes, constructing such a model remains a di¢cult, and open, research challenge. As indicated in the introduction, existing studies that exploit patent reforms for identiÖcation have treated the policy changes as exogenous. 30 Details of the Örst stage parameter estimates are available on request. A brief summary of the qualitative results for the instruments (based on statistically signiÖcant coe¢cients) is as follows. Greater Political_Constraints (stronger policy commitment) are associated with the absence of price controls and shorter process and product patents. Executive_Orientation from a Center party makes price controls less likely (more likely with a Left party) and is associated with longer process and product patent protection. Higher Ethnolinguistic_diversity (weaker policy commitment) makes price controls less likely, process patents shorter, and product patents longer. Turning to Legal_Origin, we Önd that price controls are most strongly associated with French legal origins, followed by U.K. and German legal systems. The German and U.K. legal origins are also associated with longer process and product patents. Finally, higher RTA (more trade openness) is correlated with longer process and product patents as well as the presence of price controls. residuals and add them as regressors in the hazard model. Exogeneity of individual policy regimes is tested by the statistical signiÖcance of the coe¢cient on the associated generalized residuals, and by joint tests for groups of regimesóe.g., process and/or product patents.
We strongly reject the hypothesis that price controls are exogenous, using each of four instrument sets (p-values: <0.001 for the Örst three sets, and 0.004 for the fourth). However, the tests for patent regimes are mixed: we reject the hypothesis that Short_Process and Medium_Product patent regimes are exogenous, but do not reject the hypothesis for the other four patent regimes (using three of the four instrument sets). However, we strongly reject the joint hypothesis test that the process patent and/or patent regimes are exogenous (p-values<0.001) using each of the instrument sets.
In view of these mixed Öndings, we proceed to estimate the hazard model allowing for endogenous policy regimes. To do this, we follow the approach of Lillard (1993) and formulate the model as a system of four simultaneous equations: the hazard launch equation and the three policy regime equations (probit for price regulation, ordered probits for process and product patent regimes). Each of the regime equations includes all country-level variables from the hazard model plus the instruments described above. This model is estimated by full information maximum likelihood. 31 In Table 6 we summarize the FIML parameter estimates for the patent and price regu- (1) and (2) are very similar to those from the Weibull speciÖcation. 32 Column (2) includes a normally distributed country random e §ect, with little impact on the estimated coe¢cients in column (1). 33 31 Two points should be noted. First, we introduce correlation between the disturbances in the launch and regime equations by adding a common random country e §ect to each (its coe¢cient is normalized in the process patent equation). In the absence of such correlation, the regimes would not be endogenous in the launch equation (which the Rivers-Vuong test rejected). E §orts to estimate the launch equation by non-linear GMM as a less restrictive alternative to the FIML procedure used did not succeed in obtaining convergence. With time-varying covariates, the data form a large unbalanced panel in which each observation in the GMM objective function (observed launch status minus predicted in the Önal period) is conditional on the entire history of each drug-country up to the last period observed, making the selection of valid instruments very challenging. 32 The duration-dependent part of the hazard function is modeled using year dummies for t 2 [0; 9] and t > 9. Estimated coe¢cients on these time dummies imply a pattern of duration dependence consistent with a Weibull distribution with slope parameter of about 0.6, through to about 12 years. 33 Not surprisingly, estimated coe¢cients on some of the other country-speciÖc variables that change to what we found in the earlier regressions. Process patents raise the hazard of launch (i.e., reduce launch lags), and the impact increases with the duration of such patents, though the di §erences are not all statistically signiÖcant. (Note that in the earlier results for the baseline speciÖcation we found no signiÖcant impact for long process patents, but when we use instruments we do). Again, as before, we Önd that Medium_Product and Long_Product have large impacts on launch lags, while short product patents have little e §ect. Third, the pattern of estimated parameters is fairly robust across the di §erent instrument sets. 34 
Policy Simulations
In this section we simulate how di §erent policy choices a §ect the speed of new drug di §usion.
The metric we adopt is the predicted time it takes for 25 percent of drugs to be launched (LAG25 ) under di §erent counterfactual policy regimes. Using our estimated parameters, we solve for the value of the 25th percentile of the estimated ëfailureí function for each drug/country observation, conditional on covariates, and then examine the median value across observations. 35 We begin with a benchmark computation of LAG25 for a regime with no patent protection or price regulation, and then introduce three counterfactual policy regimes: short process patents, long product patents, and price controls. Table (7) shows results for both for all drugs and for subset of FDA-approved drugs, and then for low, middle and high income countries.
relatively little over time (such as health expenditures/GDP) are sensitive to including a country random e §ect. 34 There are some exceptions: the impacts of Medium_Product and Long_Product are notably larger in columns (4), (5) and (6) , and in column (5) the coe¢cient on Short_Process is not signiÖcant while the coe¢cient on Short_Product is signiÖcant at the 5 percent level. Table 7 is based on the baseline Weibull regression estimates from column (4) of Table 4 which, as discussed in the previous section, likely under-estimate the impact of policy choices on launch lags. The results further conÖrm our descriptive Öndings that di §usion of new drugs is slow, and varies across drug and income categories. 36 In the benchmark case with no patents or price controls, it takes 4.63 years for 25 percent of drugs to be launched in the pooled sample. This falls to 3.01 years for FDA-approved drugs, which is good news from a welfare perspective. But there is substantial variation across income categoriesóthe median lags are more than three times longer in low income countries (8.85 years) as compared to high income countries (2.60 years). Setting the patent regime to short process patents only (i.e., Short_Process = 1 and price controls and all other patent variables = 0) reduces predicted launch lags by about 25 percent. Slightly shorter launch lags are estimated for a regime with no process patents but long product patents (and no price controls). Introducing price controls in a regime with no patents increases lag times by 29 percent above the benchmark. Recall that given the functional form of the baseline empirical model, the percentage e §ects of these policy regimes are additive: thus introducing both price controls and Long_Product generates a predicted median value of LAG25 of 4.09 years. In other words, price regulation removes most of accelerated di §usion induced by long product patents.
Panel A of
Panel B presents the median predicted launch lags when we use the FIML parameter estimates on the policy variables, which take into account the endogeneity of policy regimes. 37 Using these coe¢cients, product patents emerge as much more e §ective than process patents (69 percent reduction in launch lags compared to 29 percent), and price regulation has a very large impact, more than doubling launch lags.
In both panels, the same pattern of results holds for the subset of FDA-approved drugs, and for low, middle, and high income countries. In low income countries, LAG25 is depressingly high in the benchmark case, at almost nine years. Notice that, based on these results, a policy regime directed solely at lowering prices on drugs that have been already been launched (no patents, and strong price controls) would increase launch lags very substantially to over three times longer than in a ëpro-innovatorí regime with no price controls and long product patents. Some qualiÖcations should be kept in mind. First, these calculations are not a welfare assessment of di §erent regimesóthat would require, at a minimum, consideration of how these policies they a §ect drug prices. This is extremely di¢cult unless one can model both 36 Although similar to the numbers in Table 3 , note that these Ögures are not directly comparable since they control for economic and demographic variables, drug therapeutic class, and set the patent and price controls policy variables to counterfactual values. 37 SpeciÖcally we recompute the predicted launch lags from the Weibull model after substituting the coe¢cients on the patent and price controls variables with values from the FIML estimates in column (3) of Table 6 (which has a minimal, conservative instrument list). the demand sideóas a practical matter, this requires restricting the analysis to speciÖc classes of drugs (e.g., Chaudry, Goldberg and Gia, 2006)óand the supply side, i.e., the investment required for launch. Second, because our empirical model is not structural, counterfactual assessment of policies is subject to the Lucas critique, among other issues.
A third, and related, point is that countries develop institutions, and invest in human capital, over long time periods, and in ways that both ináuence, and in turn are ináuenced by, the policy regimes they adopt. Thus there may be important, and unmodeled, path dependencies driving observed outcomesóand the estimated policy impacts shown here may take many years to unfold. Any assessment of a new policy regime needs to take into account the capacity of the country to adapt and the costs of doing so.
Concluding Remarks
This paper studies how patent rights and price regulation a §ect launch lags for new drugs.
Using new data on launches of 642 new molecules in 76 countries during 1983-2002, we show that, all else equal, longer and more extensive patent protection accelerated di §usion, while price regulation strongly delayed it. Health policy institutions, and economic factors that make markets more proÖtable, also sped up di §usion. These results hold both for developing countries and high income countries, and the results are robust to using instrumental variables to address the endogeneity of policy regimes. Our Öndings also raise the broader point, not limited to pharmaceuticals, that patent rights can have an important impact on the di §usion of new innovations as well as on the rate at which new innovations are created.
Of course, the same policies that promote faster launchóstronger patent rights and the absence of price regulationóare also those that raise prices. This highlights the basic tradeo § countries face between making new drug therapies available and making them a §ordable. Finding ways to best mitigate the adverse e §ects of this tradeo § is a major challenge.
There are two main directions for future research. One is to study how severe the tradeo § between faster di §usion and higher prices actually isói.e., how much prices are raised by stronger process or product patent protectionóby using data on sales and prices within countries with di §erent patent regimes. A second interesting direction for research is to develop a structural model of drug launches which could be used to back out unobserved launch costs in each country and then to conduct important counterfactual policy experiments. One question of particular interest is the e §ects on global drug di §usion of introducing multilateral recognition of drug trials and regulatory approval. The drug launch data for India were obtained from a second source, the ìFirstIndiaî dataset of product sales compiled by ORG MARG, a market research company. This covers the period 1967 to 1997 but only for a partial set of therapeutic classes, namely antibiotics, cancer, and antiulcer. There were 498 observations on brand name, active ingredient(s), therapeutic class, and launch date.
Identifying drug launches in these data consistently across countries and over time was a serious challenge. In the data, 14 percent of records had no listing of active ingredients, only a brand name, for about one Öfth of which the active ingredient could be ërecoveredí through lookup of the brand name or through parsing of the composition Öeld. Moreover, 24 percent of records were for multi-ingredient or combination products: in some cases more 30 than 20 ingredients were listed. About 20 percent of products fell into categories in which active ingredients were prohibitively di¢cult to identify consistently (vaccines, biologics, hormones, allergens, immune globulins etc.), appeared to be for non-prescription products such as nostrums, over-the-counter, or proprietary formulations, herbal and homeopathic medicines, or were for ënon-drugí medical products, such as blood-testing strips, imaging contrast agents, non-medicinal or inactive ingredients or excipients, diagnostics, and surgical solutions.
As a preliminary step, we therefore excluded 17,452 records for products whose ingredients could not be identiÖed. After a very careful e §ort to identify brand names of known drugs, we believe that no instances of launches of new drugs were excluded for this reason. We further excluded 37,199 records in therapeutic classes largely populated with non-prescription or hard to identify products, 38 In principle each active ingredient is unambiguously identiÖed by the generic name, in practice these are not fully standardized, or may use spelling variations from di §erent languages, or may not have been assigned. After excluding non-drug or hard-to-identify products and ingredients, we observe 9,065 distinct active ingredients in the remaining 115,123 observations on country and ingredient. Considerable e §ort was invested in coding these consistently, to avoid under-identiÖcation of drug launches. A variety of online and hardcopy reference sources were consulted, including: the ChemIDplus database main- 38 Products in the following therapeutic classes: toothpaste and dentifrices, digestives, vitamins, mineral supplements, tonics, laxatives, anti-anemics, topical antihaemorrhoidals, certain dermatologicals (emollients and protectives, wound and ulcer preps, anti-pruritics, disinfectants, medicated dressings, acne, miscellaneous), parenteral nutrition, bacterial immunostimulants, smoking cessation, herbal cough and cold, ophthalmics, otologicals, allergens, herbal and homoeopathic medicines. These were identiÖed through the ATC codes (A1A, A9, A11, A12, A13, A6, B3A, B3B, C5A, D2, D3, D4, D8, D9, D10, D11, K, L3X, N7B, R5F, S, T, V) or through manual examination. Vitamins and non-prescription or OTC drugs were identiÖed from reference sources such as the Physicansís Desk Reference for Nonprescription Drugs and Dietary Supplements. Herbal and homeopathic products were identiÖed by hand inspection, lookup in Physiciansí Desk Reference for Herbal Medicine, or being manufactured by a company specializing in herbal products e.g. Arkopharma, Weleda. 39 These are the drug combinations with demonstrated synergistic e §ects: co-amoxiclav, co-amilofruse, coamilozide, co-amoxiclav, co-beneldopa, co-bucafapap, co-careldopa, co-climasone, co-codamol, co-codaprin, co-cyprindiol, co-drydamol, co-erynsulÖsox, co-áuampicil, co-áumactone, co-hycodapap, co-methiamol, cooxycodapap, co-phenotrope, co-proxamol, co-simalcite, co-spironozide, co-tenidone, co-tetroxazine, cotriamterzide, co-trifamole, co-trimazine, co-trimoxazole, and co-zidocapt. (1) the Örst date it appears in the IMS or ORG MARG datasets, (2) the Örst date it appears in the FDAís drugs@fda approvals database, (3) the Örst date it was listed as approved for marketing in any country in the Pharmaprojects database. To avoid problems with left-censoring of launch dates in 1982 in the IMS data, we exclude any drugs for which the Örst worldwide launch date deÖned this way was before 1983. We also exclude drugs that were only launched in Japan and Taiwan and/or Korea, which appear to reáect medical practice idiosyncratic to this region. This leaves us with 642 drugs, for which we observe 17,189 drug-country observations on the timing of launches.
To prepare this dataset for survival analysis, we use the Örst worldwide launch date to determine t=0 for each molecule, and then for each drug-country combination create annual observations for the time-varying and non-time varying covariates described below for each year until either the drug is launched in that country or is censored. Care was taken to exclude country-years where a drug was not at risk of launching (as observed in these data), for example if data were not reported for that country until after the Örst worldwide launch date, or if the drug were in a therapeutic class not covered in these data for that country, for example antihypertensives in India. This gives a total of 298,605 observations on 38,180 drug-country combinations, with the launch date was censored for 20,991 drug-country combinations.
32
Explanatory variables
Patent Protection
We construct measures of the availability and duration of patent protection for (a) pharmaceutical products and (b) chemical processes is coded for each country-year, along with presence of enforcement mechanisms.
Two sources were used. Data compiled by Ginarte and Park (1997) and Park (2008) who give dummy variables coded every 5 years 1960-2000 for up to 120 countries on (1) ëCoverageíói.e., availability of patent protection for di §erent classes of subject matter, here the relevant category is chemicals and pharmaceuticals, process and product; (2) Using the patent term, we deÖne the following process and product patent regimes: 
Price Controls
Each countryís price control regime was coded as None/Some/Extensive from the sources listed in Lanjouw (2005) . The designation ëSomeí means that the country has formal price control regulation but it covers only a subset of drugs. ëExtensiveí means that the regulation covers most drugs and/or is viewed in the sources as particularly restrictive. In the regressions a dummy variable for price control regime = Extensive is used.
Demographic and Income Variables
Age distribution: For each country-year, the total population, and percentage of the population over 65 years old are taken from the World Bank, World Development Indicators.
We also used the percentage of the population under 5 years old, but found no e §ect in the regressions. 
Health Institutions
We use the following dummy variables: EDL = 1 if the country has adopted an Essential Drug List NDP =1 if the country has adopted a National Drug Policy NF = 1 if the country has adopted a National Formulary Each of these variables varies across countries and time. Taken from sources listed in Lanjouw (2005) . 
Local Technical Capacity
Instrumental Variables
Political_Constraints: a measure of credible policy commitment (the degree of political constraints on policy change). It is derived from a spatial model of political interaction and is based on the number of independent veto points in the di §erent branches of the political system and the distribution of political preferences both across and within these branches.
Higher values represent greater political constraints (and thus greater policy commitment).
For details see Henisz (2000) . Regional Trade Agreements (RTA): the cumulative number of regional trade agreements that the country has entered as of a given year. This varies across countries and over time.
These data were compiled from NOTES: * significant at 5 percent and ** significant at 1 percent. 298,605 observations. All regressions include a piece-wise linear specification of the baseline duration dependency (dummies for years t=0,...,9 and t>9), the full set of controls for demographic variables, bureaucratic quality, and therapeutic category dummies (as in Table 4 , column (4) and Table 5 .) Columns (1) and (2) are single equation estimates. Columns (3)-(6) are estimates using the approach developed by Lillard (1993), i.e. FIML estimation of a four-equation system in which the process patent, product patent and price control regimes are all treated as endogenous and are estimated as ordered probit regressions for patent regimes and probit for price controls. The same set of instruments is used in each of the policy regime equations, but varies across specifications in the table (as indicated in the column headings). Heteroskedastic-robust standard errors in parentheses. 
